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CHAPTER 1: BEING AN IMAGE OF GOD  
 
This chapter argues that Scripture forms the basis of Gregory’s vision of the human 
eikon. As observed in the Introduction, the fourth-century was a complex syncretism 
of philosophical trends and ideas; undoubtedly Gregory absorbed a variety of beliefs. 




Philo,5 and Origen.6 Towards the turn of the last century scholars began to 
                                                 
1 Henri Pinault, Le Platonisme de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze: Essai sur le relations 
du Christianisme et de l'Hellénisme dans son oeuvre théologique (La Roche-sur-Yon, 
France: G. Romain, 1925); Jan M. Szymusiak, Éléments de théologie de l’homme 
selon saint Grégoire de Nazianze (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1963), 
29.  
2  Andrew O.P. Hofer, Christ in the Life and Teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 124-51. 
3 Susanna Elm, "Inscriptions and Conversions: Gregory of Nazianzus on Baptism (Or. 
38-40)," in Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, ed. Kenneth 
Mills and Anthony Grafton (New York, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 
1-35; Althaus, Die Heilslehre des heiligen, 57-60; Boris Maslov, “οἰκείωσις πρὸς 
θεόν: Gregory of Nazianzus and the Heteronomous Subject of Eastern Christian 
Penance,” ZAC 16 (2012): 311-43. 
4  Dayna Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination: A Consideration of Eight 
Prayers by Gregory of Nazianzus," VC 61, no. 2 (2007): 157-88.  
5  Francesco Trisoglio, "Filone Alessandrino e l’esegesi cristiana: contributo alla 
conoscenza dell’influsso esercitato da Filone sul IV secolo, specificatamente in 
explore more fully the way in which Gregory uses Scripture in order to make his 
claims about doctrine. Frances Young, Ben Fulford, Brian Matz, Paul Gallay, and 
Kristoffel Demoen provide a sample of those who have brought to the fore different 
aspects of Gregory’s exegesis and made clear the extent to which Gregory draws on 
Scripture to form his arguments.7 
Beginning with a brief overview of Gregory’s hermeneutics, we shall see that 
Gregory approaches the Bible primarily in light of Jesus Christ as the “focal center of 
God’s ordering of all of history.”8 Moving on from here, we explore the predominant 
biblical themes from which Gregory draws in order to form his vision of the human 
eikon. These entail: Christ the visible Eikon; beliefs about images and idols in light of 
the creation narratives in Genesis; the ethical implications of being an eikon; and later 
                                                                                                                                           
Gregorio de Nazianzo," ANRW II, 21, no. 1 (1984): 588-730. 
6 Claudio Moreschini, "Nuove considerazione sull’origenismo di Gregorio Nazianzo," 
in Origene e l’alessandrinismo cappadoce (III-IV secolo), ed. Mario Giradi and 
Marcello Marin (Bari: Edipuglia, 2002), 207-18.  
7  Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Ben Fulford, Divine Eloquence; 
Brian Matz, Gregory of Nazianzus (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2016); 
Paul Gallay, "La Bible dans l'oeuvre de Grégoire de Nazianze le Théologien," in Le 
monde greg ancien et la Bible, ed. Claude Mondésert (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 
1984), 313-34; Kristoffel Demoen, Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory 
Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996). 
8  Fulford, Divine Eloquence, 1; Mario Baghos, "St Gregory the Theologian's 
Metanarrative of History," Phronema 26, no. 2 (2011): 63-79, 75. 
pseudepigraphal interpretations which set the eikon in a cosmological battle with the 
devil. Like the church fathers before him, Gregory deploys eikon in a variety of ways, 
describing primarily the human person and Christ, but also referring to metaphors, 
paintings and pagan statues.9 Gregory’s broad application reflects the fact that eikon 
plays a substantial role in patristic theology, occupying over five pages in Lampe’s 
Patristic Greek Lexicon, compared with less than a page in Liddell, Scott and Jones’ 
A Greek-English Lexicon.10 Deriving from εἴκω, which translates as “to be like, to 
seem,” εἰκών can mean “likeness” in the sense of that which is physical, such as a 
picture or a statue, or that which is immaterial, for example, a phantom or semblance. 
We shall see that this melting pot of interpretations feed into Gregory’s overall vision 
of the eikon. Although Christian iconography was beginning to be discussed by 
Christians in the fourth century, we do not move on to discuss this since Gregory 
himself mentions only pagan images.11  
                                                 
9 For eikon being used to depict paintings; see Or. 2.11 (SC 247, 104); 4.65 (SC 309, 
172); 4.80 (SC 309, 202); 11.2 (SC 405, 332); 14.32 (PG 35, 900D); 21.22 (SC 270, 
156); eikon as metaphor; Carm. 1.2.24 (PG 37, 793, 37); eikon as pagan statues; Or. 
11.5 (SC 405, 338); Carm. 1.2.27 (PG 37, 854, 8). 
10  Geoffrey W.H. Lampe, PGL (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 410-16; Henry 
George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th 
with supplement ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; repr., 1973), 485. 
11 Also observed by Jostein Børtnes, "Eikôn Theou: Meanings of Likeness in Gregory 
of Nazianzus." In Studia Patristica 41, edited by Frances M. Young, Mark J. Edwards 
and Paul Parvis, (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 287-91. For the beginnings of Christian 
worship of images, see Ernst Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before 
Gregory’s Hermeneutics 
 
Gregory makes explicit his view of the books which he considers to be “divinely 
inspired,” in a poem entitled On the Genuine Books of Divinely Inspired Scripture.12 
He states that all else is not genuine, although, as Demoen and Gallay have observed, 
this does not prevent him from citing and alluding to numerous extra-canonical books 
which are not included in this list.13 For example, Gregory mentions by name the 
books of Wisdom and of Revelation, although they are excluded from his poem.14 
As Daley has suggested, iconographers often depict Gregory holding a Bible 
because, for Gregory, Scripture could be said to be the “doorway to divinization.”15 
                                                                                                                                           
Iconoclasm," DOP 8 (1954): 83-150, 88-150.  
12 Carm. 1.1.12 (PG 37, 472-474). This poem is translated by Brian Dunkle, Poems on 
Scripture: Saint Gregory of Nazianzus (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 
2012), 37-39. 
13 Paul Gallay, "La Bible dans l'oeuvre de Grégoire de Nazianze le Théologien," 318; 
for example, the Book of Judith is cited in Or. 45.15 (PG 36, 644B); Baruch 3.36 is 
cited in Or. 30.13 (SC 250, 252-54); Or. 1.6 (SC 247, 78-80) is reminiscent of Tobit 
10.4.  
14 Or. 42.23 (SC 384, 100-02) denotes Solomon as the author of Wisdom.  
15  Brian Daley, "Walking through the Word of God: Gregory of Nazianzus as a 
Biblical Interpreter," in The Word Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology 
in Honor of Richard B. Hays, ed. J. Ross Wagner, Christopher Kavin Rowe, and A. 
Katherine Grieb (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 514-31, 523. 
When we consider the question of Gregory’s biblical interpretation, we must 
remember that he approached the Bible as a priest and a pastor, concerned both with 
his own purity and that of the Church. He wrote a prayer for praying prior to reading 
Scripture; in this he writes that the Bible is a book of “holiness and purity” through 
which God may attend to the soul of God’s servant. 16  He considers time spent 
dwelling in the written word to be the best use of time; this is indicated by the vast 
number of poems which comprise passages of the Bible put to verse, produced by 
Gregory for the purpose of easy memorisation. 17  Aside from poems, much of 
Gregory’s biblical interpretation occurs in the context of festal orations, where 
language is sacramental, conveying “the eternal meaning of the biblical events that 
are being celebrated.”18 Gregory writes that only the one whose heart has been made 
to burn as she reads the Bible is fit to stand and speak about God, since the text itself 
is a means of illumination.19 He counts himself among those who are illumined, since 
in On the Holy Spirit, Gregory bases his arguments for the deity of the Spirit solely on 
Scripture, thus demonstrating that he is able both to interpret the Bible and speak 
about God. 20  Whilst Gregory did not leave behind a plethora of exegetical 
commentaries, we should not conclude that the act of interpretation was of little 
                                                 
16 Carm. 1.1.35 (PG 37, 517, 10). 
17 Carm. 1.1.15 (PG 37, 475-506).  
18 Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis, 143-44. 
19 Or. 2.71 (SC 247, 182-84); 2.96-97 (SC 247, 214-16); 40.37 (SC 358, 282-84). 
20 For further discussion of Gregory’s use of Scripture in the defence of the Spirit; see 
Thomas A. Noble, "Gregory Nazianzen’s Use of Scripture in Defence of the Deity of 
the Spirit," TB 39 (1988): 101-23. 
consequence to him.21 On the contrary, Gregory prizes not only the Bible itself, but 
also holds clear ideas about how it should be read and by whom it should be 
interpreted.22 As Fulford has argued, Gregory continued in Origen’s understanding of 
Scripture, whilst “formulating a hermeneutic of the biblical witness to Jesus Christ.”23 
Origen’s three senses roughly correspond to the literal, moral and spiritual readings 
representing body, soul and spirit; above all, allegory is prized.24 Our purpose does 
not concern the nuances of how Gregory follows Origen, other to recognise that 
Gregory’s overall approach to Scripture should not be simply categorised as  
‘typological’, ‘literal’ or ‘allegorical’.25 Our focus here is on how Gregory interprets 
Scripture in light of salvation history. 
A number of commentators have drawn attention to the idea that for Gregory 
“the Bible is Christ, because its every word brings us into the presence of the one who 
spoke it.”26 This approach differs from the majority of contemporary Western biblical 
                                                 
21 Or. 37 (SC 318, 270-319) is Gregory’s only exegetical oration, focusing on Matt 
19:12. 
22 Or. 31:21-24 (SC 250, 314-22). 
23 Ben Fulford, "Gregory of Nazianzus and Biblical Interpretation," in Re-Reading 
Gregory of Nazianzus, ed. Christopher A. Beeley (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2012), 31-66; 31-32. 
24 For Origen’s system of exegesis, see Karlfried Froehlich, Biblical Interpretation in 
the Early Church (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 48-78.  
25 Fulford, "Gregory of Nazianzus and Biblical Interpretation," 32. 
26 Paul Evdokimov, Orthodoxy, trans. Jeremy Hummerstone (New York: New City 
Press, 2011), 194; Charles Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible 
scholarship. For, when approaching the biblical narrative of the human story, and in 
particular the human eikon, Western scholars often read it in light of the “creation, 
fall, redemption” narrative which runs from Genesis to Revelation. Gregory’s 
narrative does not follow a strictly linear construction, where the incarnation is simply 
the next chapter in the story of salvation. This is evident when he speaks about the 
creation of humanity in writings concerned primarily with Christ, or the Christian 
lifestyle, for example, On the Theophany,27 On the Lights,28 On New Sunday,29 On 
Sacred Pascha,30 poems which occur in his Arcana, and In Praise of Virginity.31 
Thus, Christ is not conceived as though he were at the middle of a straight line, where 
there is a “before” and an “after.”32 Rather than two distinctive actions, creation and 
salvation should be understood as a continual process in light of Christ, “bringing the 
creature… to the stature of the Saviour, by whom and for whom all creation came into 
                                                                                                                                           
in Ancient Christianity, Vol 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 749.  
27 Or. 38 (SC 358, 104-38).  
28 Or. 39 (SC 358, 150-97).  
29 Or. 44 (PG 36, 608A-622A). 
30 Or. 45 (PG 36, 623A-664C). The creation of the human person in Oration 38 is 
repeated almost verbatim in Oration 45.  
31  Carm. 1.2.1 (PG 37, 521-578); Peter Bouteneff, Beginnings: Ancient Christian 
Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 168. 
32 Or. 2.88 (SC 247, 202-04). 
being.”33 The principal implication of Gregory’s view of the incarnation means that 
he reads Scripture as a unified whole, focusing on the narrative of salvation. For 
example, in On Love for the Poor, Gregory moves from the Old Testament through to 
the New Testament, highlighting all the varying ways God has demonstrated his 
mercy through the ages.34 This relates to the way in which Gregory views 
 
… the convergence of humanity and divinity in Christ’s person at the 
incarnation, the significance of which (as both a remedy to evil and as opening 
up the potential for deification) places Christ metaphorically at the centre of 
the historical process.35 
 
This approach determines Gregory’s use of intertextuality, which Hays defines, “the 
embedding of fragments of an earlier text within a later one.”36 An example of this 
lies in Gregory’s first Easter oration where he reads the Israelites’ escape from Egypt 
both in light of Christ’s passion and resurrection and the new life for those following 
Christ.37  
Turning to the biblical themes upon which Gregory draws to inform his vision 
                                                 
33  John Behr, The Mystery of Christ: Life in Death (Crestwood, New York: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2006), 86.  
34 Or. 14.27 (PG 35, 892D-896A); Carm. 1.1.9 (PG 37, 456-464).  
35 Baghos, "Metanarrative of History," 75. 
36 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 14.  
37 Or. 1.1-5 (SC 247, 72-94).  
of the human eikon, let us begin with Christ. 
 
Christ, the Dynamic Image 
 
Gregory’s interpretation of Christ as Eikon originates in the Greek translation of the 
Hebrew in Genesis 1:26-27; ונתומדכ ונמלצב םדא השענ םיהלא רמאיו.38 The differences are 
minor: the Septuagint omits the second pronominal suffix “our” and repeats the prefix 
“according to” (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ 
καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν). 39  Nevertheless, Philo explains that they are important. The early 
Christians preserved his work for generations; furthermore, he serves as the first main 
overlap between Greek philosophical thought and Judaism. Although Gregory himself 
makes no direct reference to Philo in his surviving works, Trisoglio has demonstrated 
successfully that Gregory is familiar with Philo’s thought.40 Regarding Genesis 1:26-
27, Philo explains that moving from the Hebrew “in” to the Greek “according to” 
points towards the human person as an eikon of an Eikon.41 From this position, he lays 
out a system of thought regarding the eikon, where the eikon is the Logos, through 
                                                 
38 Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia, 2. Whilst Gen 1:26-28 are often read together, for 
our purposes we will be discussing Gen 1:26-27 throughout.  
39 From hereon I cite LXX first, followed by Hebrew Bible references in ellipsis on 
the occasions when the references are different. 
40 Trisoglio, "Filone Alessandrino," 588-730. 
41 Her. 230-31. 
whom the world was made.42 Origen builds on this by explaining that the Logos is 
“in” the image of God, whereas humanity is “according to” the image of God: 
 
In addition a principle [beginning] is that in accordance with which something 
is, that is, in accordance with its form. So, if indeed the first-born of all 
creation is “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15), the Father is his 
principle. But similarly Christ is the form of those who have come to be in 
accordance with the image of God. Therefore, if men are created “according to 
the image”, the image itself is “according to the Father.”43 
 
Whilst Gregory does not offer a systemic explanation like Origen, he follows Philo, 
Paul, Origen and later fathers by interpreting Christ as the Eikon according to whom 
human eikones are created, the implications of which we discuss in depth in the 
following chapter. 
Two further traditions feeding into the concept of Christ as the Eikon of God 
run through the biblical narrative. First, Paul’s Adam Christology where Christ is the 
second Adam, the true bearer of the divine Eikon in contrast to Adam;44 secondly, the 
                                                 
42 Spec. 3.81; Spec. 3.83; Leg. 3.96. John 1:1, 14 refers to Jesus Christ as the Logos. 
43 Comm. Jn 1.104; translation, Joseph W. Trigg, Origen (London: Routledge, 1998), 
122.  
44 1 Cor 11:7, 15:49; 2 Cor 3:18, 4:4. George H. Van Kooten, "Image, Form and 
Transformation. A Semantic Taxonomy of Paul's "Morphic" Language," in Jesus, 
Paul, and Early Christianity: Studies in Honour of Henk Jan De Jonge, ed. Rieuwerd 
Buitenwerf, Harm W. Hollander, and Johannes Tromp (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 213-42, 
portrayal of Wisdom as the eikon of God’s goodness in Wisdom 7:26 and in Philo.45 
Paul’s Adam Christology is the tradition that is most relevant to this study, since its 
soteriological emphasis is evident in Gregory’s thought about the human eikon’s 
restoration, as I discuss shortly. Paul argues that the believer is no longer affiliated to 
the “first Adam” but rather the goal is to become the eikon of the “heavenly man” (1 
Cor 15:49). Dragoş Giulea has coined this process “Eikonic soteriology” because it 
represents the “transformation from being the eikon of Adam into the eikon of the 
glorious Jesus…the eikon of the Heavenly Anthropos and the second Adam.” 46 
Beginning at baptism (Rom 6:3-5), salvation is viewed through an eschatological lens, 
whereby humanity’s transformation into Christ’s eikon is understood to be a dynamic 
process, rather than a “one-off” event. The follower of Christ is transformed by 
encountering the glory of the Lord through which believers “are being transformed 
into the same eikon from one degree of glory (δόξα) to another” (2 Cor 3:18). This 
accounts for Gregory’s dynamic approach to the human eikon which, as we shall 
discuss in Chapter Five, depicts the eikon becoming divine. Next, we look back to the 
creation chapters in Genesis, arguing that Gregory weaves into his interpretation of 
these contemporary beliefs about pagan images and idols. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
216. 
45 Leg. 1.43; see James D.G. Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, 
NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 89; Friedrich-Wilhelm Eltester, Eikon im 
Neuen Testament, BZNW (Berlin: Topelmann, 1958), 76. 
46 Dragoş A. Giulea, Pre-Nicene Christology in Paschal Contexts: The Case of the 
Divine Noetic Anthropos (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 155. 
Images and Idols47 
 
The depiction of the human person as God’s eikon occurs first in Genesis 1:26-27, in 
which God’s creation of humankind forms the climax of the creation account.48 Since 
Gregory informs his readers that he does not know Hebrew, the following passage is 
translated from the Septuagint:49 
 
And God said, “Let us make the human being according to our eikon and 
likeness (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ 
                                                 
47 A version of this section of the chapter is published as an article in Scottish Journal 
of Theology 72/2, “The Human Icon: Gregory of Nazianzus on Being an Imago Dei.” 
48 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks, rev. ed., OTL (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1972), 57. Scholars are generally agreed that the redaction of Genesis 1 
belongs to a Priestly source; Gordan J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, WBC (Waco: Word, 
1987), xxxvii-xlii. For broad coverage of the history of the exegesis of Gen 1:26–28, 
see Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Continental Commentary, trans. John 
Scullion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 147–55; Gunnlaugur A. Jónsson, The 
Image of God: Genesis 1:26-28 in a Century of Old Testament Research, CBOTS 
(Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1988).  
49 Carm. 2.1.39 (PG 37, 1335, 82-83). Gregory usually read the LXX, occasionally 
referring to Theodotion’s translation, see Demoen, Pagan and Biblical Exempla, 235. 
For an overview of development of the LXX, see Sarah A. Brayford, Genesis 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1-31; John W. Wevers, Text History of the Greek Genesis 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974).  
καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν), and let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the flying 
creatures of heaven, and over the cattle and all the earth, and over all the 
reptiles that creep on the earth.” And God made humankind, according to the 
eikon of God he made it. Male and female he made them (καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, ἂρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν 
αὐτούς) (Gen 1:26-27).50 
 
Since our primary concern is Gregory’s interpretation of the human eikon, we shall 
discuss the interpretations which are relevant to Gregory’s ideas, rather than 
attempting to resolve the disparities about which contemporary Hebrew Bible 
scholars debate.51 In order to inform further the interpretation of the eikon in Genesis 
1:26-27, Hebrew Bible scholars have attended to the way in which מלצ/εἰκών is 
employed throughout the Old Testament. On a number of occasions מלצ /εἰκών 
describes a physical object, such as a statue or an idol (Wis 2.23, Num 33:52, Ezek 
                                                 
50 Translation amended from Sophie Cartwright, The Theological Anthropology of 
Eustathius of Antioch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 142. Greek text from 
Septuaginta, Alfred Rahlfs (ed.) and emended by Robert Hanhart. Rev.edn. (Stuggart, 
2006), 2. מלצ is translated consistently as εἰκών throughout the LXX; see Martin 
Rösel, Übersetzung als Vollendung der Auslegung, BZAW (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1994), 48. 
51 For views regarding ontology of the image of God, see Andreas Schüle, "Made in 
the ‘Image of God’: The Concepts of Divine Images in Gen 1-3," ZAW 117, no. 1 
(2005): 1-20, 5. For comments on structure, see Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 29-30. For 
the function of the imago Dei, see Middleton, "Imago Dei in Context," 12.  
7:20, Dan 3:1). This, alongside recent archaeological discoveries, has led certain 
scholars to re-examine ideas of the eikon in light of cultures contemporary with those 
of the Old Testament.52 Research has demonstrated that the Ancient Near Eastern 
notion of an image (מלצ) involved a ritual process of transformation.53 Once the ritual 
was completed, the image of the god was believed to embody the god so fully that the 
image became the god itself. Egyptian texts make clear that the craftsmen were not 
concerned primarily with representing what a god looked like; instead, the image was 
the place where the god manifested itself, “thus the presence of the god and the 
blessing that accompanied that presence were effected through the image.”54  The 
images were considered to be living images embodying the divine presence, rather 
than being merely lifeless wood or bronze statues. In effect, through ritual the images 
became the gods themselves and were considered to be ‘divine.’ 
This research sheds light not only on aspects of Genesis 1:26-27, but also 
Genesis 2:7 in which the author depicts the human person being formed from a 
mixture of earth and breath, akin to the formation of an eikon of a god: 
 
                                                 
52 Edward M. Curtis, "Image of God," in ABD, H-J, ed. David N. Freeman (New 
York: Doubleday, 1992), 389-91. 
53  Zainab Bahrani, The Graven Image: Representation in Babylonia and Assyria 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 121-48.  
54 Curtis, "Image of God," 389; Ellen J. Van Wolde, "The Text as an Eloquent Guide: 
Rhetorical, Linguistic and Literary Features in Genesis 1," in The Book of Genesis: 
Composition, Reception, and Interpretation, ed. Craig A. Evans, Joel N. Lohr, and 
David L. Petersen (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 134-52. 
And God formed a human being, dust from the earth, and breathed into [the 
human’s] face a breath of life, and the human became a living being (Gen 
2:7).55 
 
Interpreted thus, the human person does not ‘possess’ the eikon within herself, but 
rather the human person herself is the eikon, manifesting the presence of her Creator. 
This relates to the New Testament claim that Christ is the Eikon of the invisible God, 
who manifests God’s presence fully.  
Since the Ancient Near Eastern background is located in a vastly different 
culture from Gregory’s, we must establish an overlap in beliefs about images 
(whether statues or portraits) of gods and emperors in the Graeco-Roman world. 
Traditionally, scholars are sceptical regarding the belief that the Graeco-Roman gods 
were present in their statues. This is due to the lack of evidence for any ritual of 
animation in Ancient Greece, unlike in ancient Mesopotamia. 56  Furthermore, 
following a negative reading of Platonic mimesis, commentators on Plato have argued 
that the educated elite understood the eikon as merely a copy. 57  However, Plato’s 
application of eikon is multifaceted, encompassing linguistic eikones, shadows, statues and paintings.58 
                                                 
55 Translation adapted from NETS 
56 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 91. 
57 Verity J. Platt, Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Greco-Roman 
Art, Literature and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 204; 
Danielle S. Allen, Why Plato Wrote (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 174-76. 
58 Symp. 215a; Crat. 432c; Resp. 515a. For a discussion of the impact of names on 
Therefore, note that on occasion eikones such as the sun, the cave and soul provide us 
with “models that give access to concepts derived from and participating in 
imperceptible truths.” 59  Whilst Plato does not depict the human as an eikon, he 
describes the cosmos as a sensible god made in the eikon of the intelligible.60 This 
idea is associated with Plato’s theory of Forms, where sensible objects are images of 
eternal models, in which images denote kinship rather than mere resemblance.61 This 
occurs because the eikon proceeds from the model, “radiating from the Form” 
according to Plato.62 For this reason, on occasion Plato speaks about an eikon as 
possessing great power; for example, Alcibiades declares that the eikon of Socrates is 
capable of making him feel ashamed. 63  Shortly, we shall observe that Gregory 
describes the effect of a particular portrait of Polemon in a similar manner. 
Studies on images have successfully challenged the view that eikones are 
simply copies. They have achieved this by building on the “popular” Graeco-Roman 
                                                                                                                                           
images, see Deborah Steiner, Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek 
Literature and Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 71-73. 
59 Allen, Why Plato Wrote, 153. For further discussion of participation see ibid., 148-
53. 
60 εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αισθητός; Tim. 92c. 
61 κοινωνία; Phaed. 100d-e. 
62  Alain Besançon, The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm 
(Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 28. On likeness and difference of 
images, see Crat. 432c; Soph. 236a.  
63 Symp. 216b. 
view, which accepted the presence of deities in eikones.64 For example, Augustus 
banished Poseidon’s statue because of bad weather; through this action it was 
believed that Augustus insulted Poseidon himself.65 Also, an ambiguity in the Greek 
language means that “‘Artemis’ can imply either the goddess herself or an image of 
her.”66 This explains why so much care had to be taken when handling statues; the 
“ambiguity afforded an edge of danger, since incorrect treatment of a statue could be 
construed as an assault on the deity embodied in it.”67 This notion of representation 
extends to ancient dream theory, where it makes no difference whether the dreamer 
sees the statue of a god or the god itself.68  Images of Roman emperors are also 
                                                 
64 Christopher A. Faraone, Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardians and Statues in 
Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), passim; 
Moshe Barasch, Icon: Studies in the History of an Idea (New York: New York 
University Press, 1992), 24; Hans Belting, Likeness and Presence: A History of the 
Image Before the Era of Art, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 37; Jaś Elsner, "Iconoclasm as Discourse: From Antiquity to 
Byzantium," Art Bulletin XCIV, no. 3 (2012): 368-84, 370. 
65 Suetonius, Aug. 16. 
66 Pausanias, Descr. 3.16.9; Matthew Dillon and Lynda Garland, Ancient Greece: 
Social and Historical Documents from Archaic Times to the Death of Alexander 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 240; Jaś Elsner, Roman Eyes: Visuality & Subjectivity in 
Art & Text (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 11; Robin Lane 
Fox, Pagans and Christians (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986), 133.  
67 Elsner, Roman Eyes, 11; Pseudo-Lucian’s Amores, 15–16. 
68 Barasch, Icon, 32-33. 
pertinent to this discussion.69 For instance, Theodosius made Maximus an emperor by 
erecting the latter’s image, which he commanded the people to worship in place of 
their Alexandrian gods.70 Furthermore, in Gregory’s own lifetime, the images of the 
emperor Theodosius were smashed to pieces in the tax rebellion in A.D. 387, who 
was angry precisely because his imperial image “embodied his own actual presence 
within the city.”71 Thus, a statue of a god embodied the divine presence of the god; 
likewise eikones of emperors were perceived to embody the emperor’s presence, 
functioning as a substitute for the emperor. On the subject of emperors and their 
eikones, in his first invective Against Julian, Gregory argues that it is acceptable to 
venerate an eikon of the emperor, but not if pagan gods also feature in the same 
picture.72 This is because by the fourth century Christians accepted the emperor cult; 
but for Gregory, bowing down before portraits or statues of pagan gods was a step too 
far. He offers no such detail on the relationship between emperors and their eikones as 
Basil, who, in On the Holy Spirit writes,  
 
Because it is said that there is a king and the image of the king, but not two 
kings, for the power is not divided and the glory is not portioned out... On 
                                                 
69 Plutarch wrote that the Roman emperor was considered to be an “image of God, 
who orders all things;” Princ. Iner. 780Ε.  
70 Sabine MacCormack, Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1981), 67. 
71 Frederick G. McLeod, The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 236.  
72 Or. 4.80-81 (SC 309, 202-06). 
account of this the honour of the image passes over to the archetype.73  
 
Thus far, we have seen that pagan eikones are likenesses which have the potential to 
carry some presence or power of the figure represented, whether it is an emperor or a 
god. Pagan and Christian ideas about the power of certain portraits are also pertinent 
to this discussion. Recall Alcibiades’ reaction to the eikon of Socrates, which made 
him feel ashamed. We see a similar idea at work in Gregory’s second poem On 
Virtue.74 In this poem, Gregory recounts the experience of a whore, who comes across 
an eikon of Polemon in the home of a dissolute youth.75 First, Gregory informs his 
reader that Polemon was a man who was known for “getting the better of the 
passions.” He moves on to suggest that whoever encounters the portrait of Polemon 
meets with the image of man who is said to be virtuous. Gregory describes the 
immense power of Polemon’s gaze staring out from the portrait to such an extent that 
the woman was put to shame “as if he were alive (ζῶν).”76 Gregory’s description 
suggests that particular eikones bear a presence, or a power, which means that the 
                                                 
73 On the Holy Spirit 18.45 (SC 17, 194). Translation, Stephen M. Hildebrand, PPS 
(Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011), 80-81. Børtnes has 
identified that John Damascene quoted extensively from all the Cappadocians in the 
florilegia to his Treatises against the Iconoclasts; see “Rhetoric and Mental Images,” 
37.  
74 Carm. 1.2.10 (PG 37, 680-754). 
75 For the identity of Polemon, see Wayne Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality: 
The First Two Centuries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 22. 
76 Carm. 1.2.10 (PG 37, 738, 807). 
person encountering them meets, in some way, the figure that the portrait is depicting. 
Gregory reinterprets a contemporary belief to serve a specific purpose in his corpus of 
poems, which relates to the practice of the Christian faith. We assume that Gregory is 
drawing upon the belief that pagan statues or portraits possessed the potential to gaze 
at their onlookers in a way that suggests “magical powers.”77  This relates, albeit 
indirectly, to the beliefs about images and idols manifesting the presence of the god or 
figure they depict, which filter through a variety of ancient cultures. 
Ideas such as these, i.e. pagan images and idols bear the presence of the god or 
emperor which they embody, appear to have contributed to the interpretation of 
Genesis 1:26-27 in the work of theologians preceding Gregory; for example, Clement 
of Alexandria, living in the second-century. He asserts that human persons are 
rational sculptures of the Logos of God (Prot. I.5.4, I.6.4). As Nasrallah argues, 
Clement, “engages and reverses the theological statements of statuary and images that 
repeated across the cityscapes of the Greek East.”78 She goes as far as to suggest that 
Clement’s ideas about the image of God cannot be understood outside of the second-
century Alexandria which is a landscape full of ideas about statues and idols:79 
 
                                                 
77 Børtnes, "Rhetoric and Mental Images in Gregory," 39. 
78 Laura Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human, the Breathing Statue: The Sculptor God, 
Greco-Roman Statuary, and Clement of Alexandria," in Beyond Eden: The Biblical 
Story of Paradise [Genesis 2-3] and its Reception History, ed. Konrad Schmid and 
Christopher Riedweg (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 110-40; 110. I am indebted to 
Crispin Fletcher-Louis for pointing me to Nasrallah’s work. 
79 Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human, 110. 
We must also take these statues seriously as theological statements. That is, 
even as Christians debate incarnation and theosis, so also these statues say 
something about human possibilities of becoming divine, and about the divine 
in human form.80 
 
Clement is not the only theologian to consider the human eikon as a physical eikon; 
Irenaeus also emphasises the inclusion of the body when discussing the human eikon, 
resulting in the whole human person being, quite literally, an eikon of God.81 Thus, 
the human person could be said to be divine because she is an eikon of God, 
embodying the spirit of God. 
 Consider that for a human eikon to function like a pagan eikon, eikon must 
relate to the whole human person and not only the spiritual intellect or the soul. This 
challenges the general view concerning Gregory’s approach to the human eikon. As 
observed in the Introduction, scholars generally equate Gregory’s understanding of 
the eikon with the soul or the spiritual intellect. This discussion is influenced by the 
approach of early theologians such as Philo, who argued that the spiritual intellect 
(νοῦς) is the aspect of the human person which images God. 82  He came to this 
                                                 
80 Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human," 122. 
81  Dem. 22; see John Behr, St. Irenaeus of Lyons: The Apostolic Preaching 
(Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997); Matthew C. Steenberg, 
Of God and Man: Theology as Anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2009), 17. 
82 Spec. 1.171; Opif.134; translation David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria, On the 
Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses: Introduction, Translation and 
conclusion through his interpretation of the differing creation accounts in Genesis 1 
and 2. Scholars are almost unanimous in believing that Philo regards the accounts as 
speaking of two different people; one earthly and one heavenly.83 For Philo, it is the 
heavenly person alone who is made according to the eikon of God; this notion aligns 
itself with Philo’s idea that the eikon is not corporeal, but relates only to the spiritual 
intellect. A few centuries later, Origen presents the same view: “The soul, not only for 
the first man, but of all men arose according to the image.” 84  Whilst Gregory 
undoubtedly interprets the human eikon as the spiritual intellect on numerous 
occasions, he also interprets the eikon quite literally as a physical eikon. 
The belief that pagan statues and portraits are likenesses, which have the 
potential to bear some presence or power of the figure represented, informs Gregory’s 
interpretation of Genesis 1:26-27. For our first example of how Gregory employs 
these ideas of contemporary statuary, we need look no further than A Funeral Oration 
on the Great Basil. Here we observe Basil functioning in a manner similar to a pagan 
eikon, when Gregory likens him to a statue at the Epiphany Eucharist: 
                                                                                                                                           
Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 82. In making this move, Philo protects God from 
being understood as anthropomorphic, which is crucial to his theology; see Leg. 2.1. 
83  Leg. 1.31, 2.4. For an informative overview of the history of scholarly 
interpretation of this problem, see Thomas H. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and 
the History of Interpretation, Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 
(Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 102-34.  
84 Homily 2.1; Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah; Homily on 1 Kings 28, trans. John 
Clark Smith, TFC (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 
23. 
 With body and eyes and mind (διάνοιαν) unswerving, as though nothing new 
had occurred, but rather being fixed like a statue (ἀλλ᾽ ἐστηλωμένον) so to 
speak, for God and the altar, while those around him stood in fear and 
reverence (τοὺς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν ἑστηκότας ἐν φόβῳ τινὶ καὶ σεβάσματι).85 
 
Like a stone or wooden eikon, Basil is perfectly still. In the same way that we would 
expect pagans to respond to a pagan eikon with fear and reverence, those around Basil 
respond likewise with “fear and reverence.” In effect, Gregory treats Basil here as 
though he were a ‘divine’ eikon. If we bear in mind that eikones were often seen as 
being “direct links back to their prototypes,” it is logical that those around Basil 
would revere him, for in revering Basil as God’s eikon, they revere God.86 
 Elsewhere, ideas about the pagan eikon as a bearer of divine presence shed 
light on the occasions when Gregory contrasts directly the human eikon with the 
pagan eikon or idol (eidola). Gregory seeks to undermine the power of the pagan 
eikon, by demonstrating the unique status of the human eikon when compared to 
pagan eikones. For the human person is the eikon who truly bears divine presence 
because she alone is made alive through God’s breath.87 Gregory makes this point in 
                                                 
85 Or. 43.52 (SC 384, 234). 
86 Peter Stewart, "The Image of the Roman Emperor," in Presence: The Inherence of 
the Prototype within Images and other Objects, ed. Rupert Shepherd and Robert 
Maniura (Hants., U.K.: Ashgate, 2006), 245-58, 243-44; Suzanne Saïd, "Deux noms 
de l’image en grec ancien: idole et icône," CRAI 131, no. 2 (1987): 309–30, 323.  
87  Patricia Cox Miller, The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late 
his second poem on Ignoble Ways of Nobility: 
 
For indeed the painted eikon (εἰκών) is not greater than 
the eikon of the breathing man, even though it shines (τῆς τοῦ πνέοντος 
ἀνδρὸς, εἰ καὶ λάμπεται).88 
 
The notion of the breathing human eikon as superior to all other eikones relates back 
to the way in which the human person was created. Conflating the creation accounts 
in both Genesis 1 and 2, Gregory depicts the human eikon as animated through God’s 
Spirit in his poem On the Soul: 
 
As [God] spoke, taking a portion of freshly made earth, 
with immortal hands he established my form and gave to it a share of [God’s] 
own life.  
For into it [God] infused Spirit (πνεῦμα), a fragment of the hidden Godhead. 
From clay and breath a mortal eikon of the immortal One (βροτός ἀθανάτοιο 
εἰκών) was established…89 
 
The example above is typical of how Gregory describes the creation of the human 
eikon. She is unique amongst all eikones because she is created by God and infused 
                                                                                                                                           
Ancient Christianity (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press Incorporated, 
2012), 133-42. 
88 Carm. 1.2.27 (PG 37, 854, 8-9).  
89 Carm. 1.1.8 (PG 37, 452, 70-75). 
with God’s Spirit. Before we continue to examine Gregory’s usage of the 
contemporary beliefs relating to images and idols, we must pause for a moment to 
note the significance of Gregory’s pneumatological anthropology, a theme to which 
we shall return in Chapter Five. Above, Gregory describes the formation of the human 
eikon as the earth infused with “Spirit, a fragment of the hidden Godhead.” Thus, for 
Gregory, the Spirit gives life to the eikon and therefore gives meaning and purpose to 
the eikon. By being infused with Spirit the eikon is able to manifest the presence of 
God unlike any other kind of pagan idol. By depicting the Spirit present in the 
creation of the eikon, Gregory avoids a common oversight in theological 
anthropology. This oversight has been observed by Mark Cortez, who has argued that 
a problem occurs when theologians depict the Spirit as an “eschatological 
addendum.”90 By this, Cortez refers to the Holy Spirit being discussed only in relation 
to the renewal and transformation of the human person, but not viewed as present at 
the creation of the eikon.91 Understood in this way, the Spirit makes an appearance 
halfway through the salvation story, but only after the fall and consequent need for 
renewal and healing. The Spirit, when depicted only as doing the work of 
transforming or renewing the eikon, is absent from the initial meaning and purpose of 
the eikon. Contra this, Gregory positions the Spirit quite explicitly at the creation of 
                                                 
90 Marc Cortez, "Idols, Images and a Spirit-ed Anthropology " in A Pneumatological 
Account of the Imago Dei ed. Myk Habets (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016), 267-
82; 268. 
91 For example, see Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A 
Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2001), 225-28. 
the human eikon, before moving on to depict the Spirit’s transformation of the eikon 
during and after baptism. By making this move, Gregory not only creates the space 
for understanding the Spirit’s involvement in the creation of the eikon in terms of 
meaning and purpose (i.e. to bear the presence of God) but also he avoids the locating 
the Spirit as an “eschatological addendum.” 
As we return to discuss the human eikon in light of other kinds of images, let 
us recall that as far as Gregory is concerned, the eikon is different precisely because 
she bears the Spirit of God and manifests divine presence truly. This becomes evident 
further through Gregory’s use of language in his poem on the ten commandments, as 
they appear in Exodus 20:1-17 and Deuteronomy 5:6-22.92 The second commandment 
in Exodus is relevant to this discussion: 
 
You shall not make for yourself an idol (εἴδωλον) or likeness of anything 
whatever is in heaven above and whatever is in the earth beneath and whatever 
is in the waters beneath the earth (Ex 20:4).93 
 
Gregory interprets this commandment as, 
 
You shall not set up an empty likeness and a breathless eikon (οὐ στήσεις 
ἴνδαλμα κενὸν καὶ ἂπνοον εἰκώ).94 
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93 Translation from NETS 
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Whilst εἴδωλον occurs in both Exodus and Deuteronomy, Gregory exchanges it for 
εἰκών in his interpretation of the commandment. Since Gregory is famed for his 
rhetoric and chooses his words carefully, we should not assume that the alteration was 
either an oversight or merely to fit with the metre of the poem. Rather, Gregory 
appears to recall that there is only one true eikon of God; namely, the human person. 
Frances Young offers a thesis which relates to Gregory’s application of the ten 
commandments. She explores early church fathers’ concepts of eikon in relation to 
Exodus 20:4 and idolatry; Colossians 1:15 and Christology; Genesis 1:27 and 
anthropology, arguing that these three passages are implicitly related in Athanasius, 
the Cappadocians, and Cyril of Jerusalem.95 Young draws the three key texts together 
arguing, 
 
As the image of the Image of God human beings replace idols, all the more so 
as the corruption of sin is washed away and they are renewed after the Image 
in Christ so as to become more and more God-like.96 
 
Young’s thesis could be furthered by observing that Gregory’s poetic reworking of 
the second commandment, cited above, is an explicit, not implicit, example of the 
human eikon replacing a pagan idol. Furthermore, a significant factor in how the 
human eikon functions on earth relates to where human eikones direct their worship. 
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Gregory argues that it is not fitting for mortals to commit idolatry, precisely because 
they are eikones of God: 
 
It is not right, it is not proper for a mortal to be born from God (οὐδ᾽ ἐπέοικε 
θεοῦ βροτὸν ἐκγεγαῶτα) 
A beautiful and imperishable eikon (ἄφθιτος εἰκών) of the Heavenly Word… 
To give way unlawfully to empty idols (εἴδωλα κενά) 
Of things which live in the sea, the earth and that which flies in the air…97 
 
Above, Gregory argues that as an imperishable eikon the human person must not 
worship idols. The human person is the breathing eikon because she is filled with the 
breath of God, compared with idols which are empty; therefore she must not commit 
idolatry. 
 We will continue to explore this theme in the following chapter in which we 
see that Gregory also presents Christ as a physical Eikon; and Chapter Three, in which 
we will discuss how Gregory treats women literally as physical eikones. Together 
these examples build a picture of how Gregory views the eikon literally as visible 
eikon of God. I am not suggesting that what Gregory writes about eikones and idols is 
highly theorised; however, throughout his work, Gregory refers to physical eikones 
(whether two or three-dimensional) frequently enough to warrant considering how 
these concepts inform his overall idea of the human eikon.  
 
Becoming Divine 
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 The designation of the double “according to” (κατ᾽εἰκόνα and καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν) in the 
Septuagint translation of Genesis 1:26-27 led fathers, such as Clement, Irenaeus, and 
Origen, to place a distinction between the eikon and the ‘likeness.’98 Interpreted thus, 
God gives the eikon to humanity at creation, whereas the ‘likeness’ is regarded as a 
process of transformation which reaches its completion at the eschaton. See Origen’s 
explanation of this below: 
 
The highest good towards which every rational creature is hurrying, also 
called the end and goal of all things,... is to become like God as much as 
possible... this is indeed what Moses is pointing out above all when he 
describes the original creation of humankind... thus when he said: “In the 
image of God he created him” and said nothing more about the likeness, he is 
actually indicating that the human being did indeed receive the dignity of 
God’s image in the first creation, and the dignity of his likeness is reserved for 
the consummation.99 
 
Often scholars attribute this distinction between eikon and likeness to the adaptation 
                                                 
98 Strom. 2.131.6; Haer. 5.6.1; Princ. 3.6.1.  
99 Princ. 3.6.1, trans. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic 
Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 56. 
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Maximos Aghiorgoussis, "Applications of the Theme "Eikon Theou" (Image of God) 
according to Saint Basil the Great," GOTR 21, no. 3 (1976): 265-88, 276. 
of Platonic thought regarding progressive divinity.100 Knowing God and becoming 
like God as far as possible (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) is the telos of Plato’s 
philosophical system.101 According to Van Kooten, this is “the natural extension of 
the semantic-conceptual field of the image of God.”102 Also, Andrew Louth writes, 
 
The verse from Genesis, to a Greek philosophical ear, suggested that the 
human was made in the image of God and that human destiny was 
assimilation to God, what the Greek Fathers, especially, came to call 
deification.103 
 
Whilst Gregory speaks consistently about the eikon becoming divine, unlike Clement 
and Origen, he offers no explanation regarding the distinction between eikon and 
                                                 
100  Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
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likeness. The closest he comes to describing this distinction is in Gorgonia’s funeral 
oration. Gregory describes Gorgonia’s real citizenship being in heaven, drawing from 
Ephesians 2:17-22, Philipians 3:12-21, Galatians 4:25-26, Hebrews 12:23. On 
Gorgonia, Gregory writes, 
 
But if one is to explain her at a higher and more philosophical level, 
Gorgonia’s native land was the “Jersusalem above,” the city not yet seen but 
known, the place of our common life, towards which we hasten – where Christ 
is citizen, and his fellow citizens the festal gathering and “assembly of the first 
born whose names are written in heaven,” where they celebrate their great 
founder by contemplating his glory, circling around him in a dance that will 
never come to an end. There, nobility consists in preserving his image and 
keeping one’s likeness to the archetype (εὐγένεια δὲ ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος τήρησις καὶ 
ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐξομοίωσις).104 
 
Even here, Gregory does not echo Plato precisely in his approach to human eikones 
becoming divine. Gregory identifies Gorgonia’s likeness to the archetype as that 
which is to be preserved, rather than obtained, and within the context of the followers 
of Christ being citizens in God’s household. Thus, we cannot appreciate fully 
Gregory’s beliefs about becoming divine without also turning to the biblical narrative. 
We shall return to explore this more fully in Chapter Five. 
                                                 
104 Translation Daley, Gregory of Nazianzus, 66; Or. 8.6 (SC 405, 256); ἐξομοίωσις in 
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 Ethics and the Image of God 
 
Being created as an eikon of God entails that all human life is precious and must be 
treated with care and respect. This is the interpretation offered in Genesis 9:6, 
 
Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person’s blood be 
shed; for by divine image I made humankind.105 
 
This ethical interpretation of Genesis 1 continues to be prevalent throughout 
pseudepigraphal literature, Philo and the early church fathers.106 Gregory follows the 
author of Genesis 9:6 and later interpreters in placing a high value upon the life of the 
human eikon precisely because she images God. Taken from an oration on theological 
discourse, the lines below exemplify this: 
 
It is not the same thing to cut down a plant or a flower which blooms 
temporarily, and a human person (ἄνθρωπος). You are an eikon of God and 
you converse with an eikon of God.107 
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 Above, Gregory demonstrates two ways in which he approaches the ethics of being an 
eikon of God; namely function and ontology.108 First, he argues that, in order to image 
God, the human eikon must imitate God’s philanthropy towards other human eikones; 
this relates to the function of the eikon. Secondly, Gregory observes that human life is 
precious because human persons image God; this relates to her ontology. In a further 
oration, highlighting ethical concerns Gregory states that the ruler must rule fairly 
because he (i.e. the ruler) is an eikon of God. In making this move he argues that the 
divine function of the human eikon is to rule as God rules. Also, Gregory observes 
that the ruler should rule fairly because those over whom he rules are eikones of 
God.109 Thus, the human eikon warrants fair treatment precisely because she is an 
eikon of God. 
Observe this two-pronged approach regarding function and ontology in 
Gregory’s treatment of philanthropy towards the poor.110 Gregory argues that those 
who are poor and sick should be treated benevolently because they too are God’s 
eikones.111 Likewise, those who practise good works toward the poor and sick are 
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most like God,112 where practising philanthropy increases the divinity of the eikon.113 
Gregory’s views on the relationship between poverty, wealth and the eikon are 
consistent. They are scattered throughout his orations, poems and letters,114 occurring 
in abundance in On Love for the Poor.115 Holman has observed that Gregory exhorts 
his audience 
 
to imitate the ἰσότης of God, which translators render equality, 
evenhandedness, or “the justice of God.” He also uses ἰσονομία, a Greek 
political term meaning “equality of rights.”116 
                                                                                                                                           
Roman Cappadocia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-29. 
112 Or. 14.22-23 (PG 35, 885B-888A); 14.27 (PG 35, 892D-893A).  
113 Or. 14.27 (PG 35, 892D-893A); 17.9 (PG 35, 976B-D). 
114 Or. 8.9 (SC 405, 262-64); the whole of Or. 14 (PG 35, 858A-909C); 26.6 (SC 284, 
138-40); 38.5 (SC 358, 110-12); 43.63 (SC 384, 262-64). There are similar themes in 
Against Wealth; see Ulrich Beuckmann, Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen die Habsucht 
(Carmen 1,2,28) Einleitung und Kommentar. SGKA. NF 2 (Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 1988), 12.  
115 Or. 14 (PG 35, 858A-909C).  
116 Susan R. Holman, "Out of the Fitting Room: Rethinking Patristic Social Texts on 
"The Common Good"," in Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics: Issues and 
Challenges for Twenty-First Century Christian Social Thought, ed. Johan Leemans, 
Brian J. Matz, and Johan Verstraeten (Washington D.C., USA: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2011), 103-23, 115.  
 Thus, the purpose of the human eikon is to function like God in all ethical concerns. 
The more she functions like God, the more the eikon becomes like God, vis à vis 
‘divine.’ 
Gregory continues to develop the ethical implications of being an eikon of 
God as a major theme regarding humankind throughout his writing. Numerous 
scholars have observed that Gregory’s high view of the human eikon informs directly 
his ethics.117 Exemplifying the scholarly opinion, Mumford argues, “the concept of 





Our final consideration of the biblical background to Gregory’s account of the human 
                                                 
117 Or. 7.9 (SC 405, 202); 14.20 (PG 35, 881D-884B); 14.27 (PG 35, 892D-896A); 
26.10 (SC 284, 248); Carm. 1.2.25 (PG 37, 824, 148-53); 2.2.6 (PG 37, 1549, 89). See 
Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture, 123-24; Stanley S. Harakas, 
"Presuppositions for Ethical Method in St. Gregory the Theologian's Five Theological 
Orations," GOTR 55, no. 1-4 (2010): 89-126, 120; Verna E. F. Harrison, "Male and 
Female in Cappadocian Theology," JTS 41, no. 2 (1990): 441-71, 456; Tasos Sarris 
Michopoulos, "Mimisometha Nomon Theou: Gregory the Theologian's Ontology of 
Compassion," GOTR 39, no. 1-2 (1994): 109-21.  
118 James Mumford, Ethics at the Beginning of Life: A Phenomenological Critique 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 188.  
eikon concerns the interplay between the eikon and the devil, which is a consistent 
theme in the Bible and a strong tradition in apocryphal and pseudepigraphal 
writings.119 The dearth of research directed towards the devil, not only with reference 
to Gregory’s work, but also more widely in theology, relates to the effect of the 
Enlightenment on Western culture. 120  Modernity ushered in scepticism towards 
transcendent beings such as angels and demons. Consequently, when contemporary 
early Christian and biblical studies scholars pay due attention to the devil, it is often 
to demythologise themes concerning evil powers.121 However, we should not confuse 
the worldview of the premoderns with that which was largely adopted through 
modernity. 
The tradition which attests to the enmity between the human eikon and the 
devil appears first in Wisdom 2:23-24 as an interpretation of the first three chapters of 
Genesis: 
                                                 
119 John R. Levison, Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: from Sirach to 2 Baruch, 
JSPSS (Sheffield: JSOT, 1988), 178.  
120 For a review of the Enlightenment reluctance to accept the reality of spirits, see 
Phillip Wiebe, God and Other Spirits: Intimations of Transcendence in Christian 
Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-6. 
121  Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the 
Atonement Tradition (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004), 194. Rudolf 
Bultmann was a key figure in this trend; Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," 
in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (London: 
SPCK, 1964), 1-44; Walter Wink, Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Forces that 
Determine Human Existence (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).   
 …for God created us for incorruption, 
and made us in the eikon of his own eternity, 
but through the devil’s envy death entered the world (φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου 
θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον), 
and those who belong to his company experience it. 
 
Many scholars have observed that this theme of hostile angelic powers is also 
prevalent in the New Testament, particularly in Paul’s letters.122 The devil and his 
army of demons are seen as a threat to all that God has created, especially human 
persons.123 Paul refers directly to the notion of evil powers with reference to Christ as 
the Eikon in two ways. First, Christ as God’s Eikon has authority over the powers 
(Col 1:15, 2:10). The particular list of powers in Colossians 1:16 can also be found in 
apocalyptic writings, which are concerned with the eschatological defeat of evil.124 
Secondly, Paul writes in reference to the notion that the 
 
god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from 
                                                 
122 Clint E. Arnold, The Colossian Syncretism: The Interface Between Christianity 
and Folk Belief at Colossae (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 158; Peter T. O'Brien, 
Colossians, Philemon, WBC (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1982), 46. 
123 Dunn argues that Paul understood these powers to be real; see Colossians and 
Philemon, 93. For an argument against Dunn, see Wesley Carr, Angels and 
Principalities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 48-52. 
124 2 Enoch 20:1; 1 Enoch 41:9. 
seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the Eikon of God (2 
Cor 4:4). 
 
The “god of this world” refers to a darkness which is “cosmic, universal and 
demonic.”125 Most scholars are agreed that this refers to the devil since he is also 
named as a ruler in Ephesians 2:2, John 12:31, 14:30 and 16:11.126 Whilst Paul does 
not give his readers a detailed description of what he thinks the evil powers are, it is 
clear that the notion of evil and the devil blur into one another as “an existentially real 
power cohered in single focus.”127 
Following Gregory, throughout the book, I identify “the devil” with the 
biblical Satan, fallen angel Lucifer and the serpent in the Garden of Eden, referring to 
them interchangeably.128 In linking the various titles, Gregory follows a common 
patristic reading of Isaiah 14:12 which understands Lucifer, the Morning Star, to be 
speaking of both Satan who appears in Job and the serpent in Genesis 3.129 Ezekiel 28 
                                                 
125 Paul W. Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1997), 220. 
126 Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the 
Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 328. For Paul’s writing about “powers,” 
see Rom 8:38-39; 1 Cor 15:24; Col 1:16; Eph 1:20-21; Eph 6:12.  
127 Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 109. 
128 For an overview of the tradition, see Jeffrey B. Russell, Satan: The Early Christian 
Tradition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); Henry Ansgar Kelly, Satan: A 
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 191-214. 
129 Justin Martyr was the Christian forerunner in equating Satan with the Serpent, 
also contributes to this tradition, having been read as linking a cosmic rebel and an 
earthly king.130 In the New Testament, Revelation 12:9 draws together the serpent and 
the devil. This biblical basis is generally recognised to be the most likely source of the 
tradition, rather than the theory that the ‘fall of Satan’ myth originated from 
Zoroastrianism.131  Throughout his work, Gregory presents both the devil and the 
spiritual powers of darkness as enemies of the eikon. As Young’s comment below 
indicates, Gregory’s inspiration finds its origin in Jewish sources: 
 
A lively sense of the reality of Satan had been inherited from the Jewish 
Apocalyptic tradition, which clearly had a considerable influence on New 
Testament and second-century Christianity.132 
 
The prevalence of the struggle between the forces of evil and the human eikon is a 
                                                                                                                                           
Dial. Tryph. 45; also see Origen, Princ. 2.9.2. 
130  Neil Forsyth, The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 139-44; Hector M. Patmore, Adam, Satan, and the 
King of Tyre: The Interpretation of Ezekiel 28:11-19 in Late Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), passim. 
131 Greg J. Riley, "Devil," in Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, ed. 
Karen Van Der Toorn, Bob Beckling, and Peter W. Van Der Horst (Leiden: Brill, 
1999), 244-49, 246. 
132 Frances M. Young, The Making of the Creeds (London: SCM Press, 1991), 88; 
Everett Ferguson, Demonology of the Early Christian World (New York: Edwin 
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theme which continues in the writing of the early church fathers. Origen, advancing a 
sophisticated demonology, identifies that demons are fallen angels. Unlike the view of 
pagan Greeks, who thought that some demons were good and others were bad, Origen 
states that all demons are evil.133 They stand as powers behind the opposing political 
authorities, and their primary desire is to tempt human persons to sin. 134  Later, 
Athanasius writes most about spiritual warfare, particularly in Life of Anthony, where 
the progressive holiness and divinity of the eikon encourage more attention from the 
envious enemy. Athanasius stresses that it is the saints, having trained and placed 
themselves at the head of the battle, who struggle the most with the devil and his 
demons; however, they are far from helpless. Athanasius observes that in the Bible 
demons hold no sway even over the swine, since they must ask Christ’s permission 
before they enter the swine. On the basis of this episode, he argues that demons hold 
even less sway over the person made as God’s eikon, since she possesses greater 
authority over the powers of darkness than swine.135 
Gregory develops this tradition, by drawing even more prolifically on the 
biblical and pseudepigraphal theme of the devil and fallen angels, in order to describe 
                                                 
133 Cels. 5.5. 
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). 
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the struggle of the eikon’s existence as she endeavours to draw closer to God. Gregory 
refers to Satan with a variety of metaphors and titles, most of which can be found in 
Scripture. The vast number of names and descriptions demonstrate Satan’s 
significance to Gregory. They also serve to demonstrate the multitude of ways in 
which Gregory understands Satan as a threat. Many of the names exist as a list in the 
poem Aversion of the Evil One and Invocation of Christ:136 
 
Thief, Serpent, Fire, Belial,137 Vice, Death, Gulf, Dragon, Beast,138 Night, 
Ambusher, Rage, Chaos, Slanderer, and Murderer.139 
 
                                                 
136 Carm. 2.1.55 (PG 37, 1399-1401). 
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Elsewhere, Gregory uses “Satan,”140 “Envy,”141 the Evil One,142 “the Devil,”143 “the 
Adversary,” 144  “the Tempter,” 145  “the Enemy,” 146  “crooked,” 147  “ruler of the 
world,”148 and “destroyer of the eikon.”149 Since Gregory refers to Satan specifically 
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as the “destroyer of the eikon,” it is clear that Satan represents a particular threat to 
the human eikon which she should not ignore. Below is a further example of 
Gregory’s presentation of the devil’s hatred of the eikon which occurs in an extract 
from On His Own Life. In it, Gregory mourns the devil’s constant attack on the eikon. 
Note that here “the corrupter” (ὁ φθορεύς) is one of the many epithets given to the 
devil: 
 
Excessively numerous are the paths which lead away from 
both the straight and settled road, 
they all lead to the pit of destruction. 
Into this the corrupter has torn down the eikon, 
in order that he might gain a way of slipping in, 
dividing doctrines, rather than tongues like God in ages past.150 
 
The eikon’s encounter with demons continues to be a key theme in the work of 
theologians upon whom Gregory has exerted an influence, in particular Evagrius 
Ponticus. He was a protégé of Gregory, serving Gregory as a deacon in 
Constantinople. He produced a comprehensive demonology and method of combat in 
                                                 
150 Carm. 2.1.11 (PG 37, 1107-8, 1146-51). In his critical edition of the text, Jungck 
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over five hundred types of demonic battles.151 Brakke suggests that it is probable 
Evagrius “learned from Gregory about the danger of demonic thoughts [λογισμοί], 
and the possibility of refuting them verbally with powerful words.”152 In Chapter 
Four, we shall return to the problem of the devil’s attacks on the human eikon; we 
cannot properly interpret Gregory’s understanding of the human eikon without 
discussing her relationship with the devil. 
 In this chapter I have argued that Gregory interprets the experience of the 
human eikon in light of biblical themes and narratives. These include the creation 
narratives in Genesis; beliefs about images and idols; ideas about how the eikon might 
be perceived as ‘divine;’ ethics; and the eikon’s struggles with the spiritual powers of 
darkness. Whilst Gregory weaves into his vision of the human eikon a variety of 
biblical themes, his principal inspiration is Christ. With this in mind, we shall move to 
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